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Abstract
There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One
common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to
science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be
an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of
science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative
interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of
science. I suggest that continuing, widespread idealization calls into question the
idea that science aims for truth. If instead science aims to produce understanding,
this would enable idealizations to directly contribute to science’s epistemic success.
I also use the fact of widespread idealization to motivate the idea that science’s wide
variety aims, epistemic and non-epistemic, are best served by different kinds of scientific
products. Finally, I show how these diverse aims—most rather distant from truth—
result in the expanded influence of social values on science.
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The important role that models play in science has, in the past decades, been increasingly
appreciated by philosophers. This attention to scientific modeling has, in turn, led to an
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emphasis on the centrality of idealizations. As Wimsatt (1987, 2007) says, “Any model
implicitly or explicitly makes simplifications, ignores variables, and simplifies or ignores
interactions among the variables in the models and among possibly relevant variables not
included in the model (p.96).”1 These are all idealizations. Most broadly, idealizations
are features of representations that misconstrue the represented systems. Examples include
the common assumption in physics of frictionless planes and the common assumption in
economics that humans are perfectly rational agents. These assumptions are false of every
real system: every plane has friction, and no human is perfectly rational. Assimilating several
views about the nature of idealization, including Wimsatt’s, Weisberg (2007, 2013) identifies
three distinct purposes to which idealizations are put. These include Galilean idealizations,
which are simplifications needed to secure computational tractability, to be eliminated if and
when it proves possible; minimalist idealization, which is the elimination of all but the most
significant causal influences on a phenomenon; and multiple-models idealization, which is
the use of several distinct models that together shed light on a phenomenon. Rohwer and
Rice (2013) argue that the roles of idealization are even more varied still.
One common view is that all of this idealization may be necessary, but it results in
models that are lacking in various ways. Accordingly, the view goes, we must look for a
subsequent step, a way to connect these idealized models to the successful pursuit of the
aims of science, whether the specific aim is prediction, empirical confirmation, explanation,
accurate representation, etc. The textbook version of this view would hold that science
aims for truth, and so idealized models must be de-idealized in order to be useful. It seems
that Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011) assume something like this view, for they argue
that without the removal of all idealizations—complete de-idealization—we have “no ground,
beyond that of our background knowledge that informed the model, for claiming that the
1(Wimsatt, 1987) is republished as Chapter 6 in (Wimsatt, 2007). Page numbers here refer to the latter
publication.
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model specifies a causal relation” (p.765). Odenbaugh and Alexandrova conclude that even
the use of multiple models with different idealizations—i.e. robustness analysis—cannot yield
the description of a causal mechanism. Thus, they claim, analysis based on multiple, idealized
models does not allow for the confirmation of models, nor can it generate explanations.
Other versions of this view do not hold de-idealization to be necessary but still
anticipate the need to bridge the gap between idealized models and the traditional aims
of science. Wimsatt (2007), for instance, argues that idealized, “false” models can be used
to produce “truer” theories without recourse to de-idealization. Similar to Odenbaugh and
Alexandrova’s concern with causal description and explanation, Rohwer and Rice (2013)
argue that at least one purpose of idealizations, the investigation of general patterns across
heterogenous systems, prevents the accurate description of causal factors and, thus, prevents
the formulation of explanations (though they hold that resultant models may still be
explanatory in some weaker sense). This style of view endorses the continuing practice
of idealization, but also holds idealized models to be somewhat distant from the traditional
aims of science. These authors accordingly explicitly or implicitly commit themselves to an
intermediary step of some kind between idealized representation and achieving the aims of
science. On this strategy, even though idealized models are of scientific value, they are not
sufficient to provide adequate explanations, trustworthy predictions, causal representations,
etc.—or at least not by themselves.
One could instead take a very different approach to reconciling idealization with the aims
of science. The observation of widespread idealization in science, and the distance between
idealized models and traditional articulations of the aims of science, might be seen as grounds
for concluding that those traditional articulations of the aims of science are incorrect. On
this alternative approach, nothing has gone wrong with or is lacking from idealized models,
and no intermediary step is needed for idealized models to achieve the aims of science. Those
aims just stand in need of clarification. This is the tack I take in this paper. In §1 I develop
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a conception of science’s epistemic aim to which idealized models can directly contribute.
In particular, I suggest that science does not aim to provide truth, but instead to provide
understanding. In §2 I outline a second consequence a positive conception of widespread
idealization might be seen to have for the aims of science. Science’s diverse aims, both
epistemic and non-epistemic, often conflict and thus motivate different kinds of scientific
products. Finally, in §3 I demonstrate that this alternative conception of science’s epistemic
aim and of the relationships among science’s various aims creates new room for the influence
of social values.
1 Understanding at the Expense of Truth
Wimsatt (2007) points out, regarding idealized models, that “unless they could help us do
something in the task of investigating natural phenomena, there would be no reason for
choosing model building over astrology or mystic revelation as a source of knowledge of
the natural world” (p.101). This must be right. Idealized models, even though they are
false in some regards, must get us somewhere that mystic revelation does not. At issue
is what exactly idealized models are helping us accomplish, and in particular, the nature
of their epistemic value. Here I will explore the idea that false models are not a means
to truer theories, as Wimsatt believes, but instead themselves accomplish the end goals of
science, including its epistemic success. I do not provide a conclusive argument in favor
of understanding and against truth as science’s epistemic aim. Instead, in what follows,
I distinguish the aim of understanding from the aim of truth; motivate the former; and
show how this enables widespread idealization to directly contribute to science’s epistemic
success. Because idealizations are patently untrue, their continued presence in models cannot
be justified by their contribution to the truth of those models. Accordingly, if idealizations
directly contribute to science’s epistemic success, then this suggests the epistemic aim is
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something other than truth.
A first step toward a conception of the epistemic aim of science to which idealized models
can directly contribute is provided by Elgin (2004). Elgin is also impressed by how many
scientific laws, models, and theories diverge from the truth in various ways. Her aim is thus
to show how these scientific products can be epistemically acceptable without being entirely
true. She says,
I take it that science provides an understanding of the natural order. By this I do
not mean merely that an ideal science would provide such an understanding or
that in the end of inquiry science will provide one, but that much actual science
has done so and continues to do so (p.114, emphasis in original).
Elgin’s strategy is to accept today’s actual science as a successful venture, then look to
see what this science accomplishes. What she finds is that science regularly produces
understanding, even as it falls short of producing truths. Accordingly, rather than make
excuses for the myriad ways in which our science fails to produce truth, Elgin redefines
science’s epistemic success to consist of understanding, not (necessarily) truth.
For this approach to have promise, it must be possible for the achievement of
understanding to occur without the possession of complete truth, but understanding must
still qualify as an epistemic success. A key feature of the concept of understanding enables
it to play this role: it has a dual nature. Understanding is at once a cognitive state and
an epistemic achievement. Because it is an epistemic achievement, understanding is not
simply an “aha” moment. A felt sense of understanding is not sufficient for the possession
of understanding; understanding requires successful mastery, in some sense, of the target of
understanding. Both Grimm (2010, 2012) and Strevens (2013) describe this mastery as a
form of grasping. As Grimm (2012) stresses, “grasping” is a success term. And so, “the
mind of someone who understands mirrors or reflects reality” (Grimm, 2012, p.109). There
is some debate over whether understanding is a species of knowledge (see, e.g., Grimm,
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2006), but it is widely regarded as an epistemic success of some kind, and I take it to be as
well. On the other hand, because understanding is also a cognitive state, its achievement
partly depends on the psychological characteristics of those who seek to understand. This
distinguishes understanding from truth, for whether a proposition is true in no way depends
on the psychology of one who entertains or believes that proposition. Understanding’s
characteristics qua cognitive state accounts for how idealized representations can be well-
positioned to provide understanding.
For Grimm (2012), you cannot have objective understanding without possessing truth
(though in his view this is not understanding’s full epistemic value). In contrast, Elgin
(2004) suggests that understanding may be furthered by some departures from the truth.
In her view, “felicitous falsehoods,” or idealizations, can facilitate understanding insofar
as they “impose an order on things, highlight certain aspects of the phenomena, reveal
connections, patterns and discrepancies, and make possible insights that we could not
otherwise obtain” (p.127). Elgin gives the example of drawing a smooth curve and treating
the data’s deviation from the curve as error or noise. This idea—that departures from
truth can contribute to understanding by revealing patterns and enabling insights that
would otherwise be inaccessible—is corroborated by research in psychology. Williams et al.
(2013), for instance, provide empirical support for the idea that human understanding is
furthered by generalizations about broad patterns.2 Such generalizations are facilitated
by employing idealizations. The idealization that humans are perfectly rational agents
enables generalizations across diverse decision-making processes. The common idealization
in population biology that a population is infinite in size plays a similar role. This enables
a model to represent populations of different sizes, and to ignore the causal role of that
2More specifically, according to this research, seeking and producing explanations furthers understanding
in virtue of an emphasis on generalizations about broad patterns, and this same process can sometimes lead
to overgeneralization. Here I set aside the connection between understanding and explanation in order to
narrow the discussion, although the considerations raised here also have interesting implications for accounts
of scientific explanation.
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population size, i.e., genetic drift, a kind of sampling error.
Though allowing some departures from the truth is a natural attribute for understanding
qua psychological state, this creates trouble for the other part of understanding’s dual nature,
understanding qua epistemic success. Elgin (2004) has a solution on offer. She proposes
that truth is in fact still a requirement on understanding, but it functions as a threshold
concept. A claim must be “true enough” in order to be epistemically acceptable; that is,
any divergence from the truth must be negligible, or safely neglected. Whether a claim is
epistemically acceptable depends on the function it plays in an argument, explanation, or
theory—or, one might further generalize, in a model or other representation. Elgin appeals
to the example of Snell’s law, which governs light’s angle of refraction when it passes from
one medium to another. Snell’s law is only true of optically isotropic media, but it is true
enough of media that are nearly isotropic, which include a wide range of media in which
physicists are interested.
I follow Elgin in taking truth to be a threshold requirement for epistemic acceptability,
but in my view, one amendment is needed. Whether a claim is true enough depends not
only on its function in an argument, explanation, theory, or representation, as Elgin holds.
It also depends on the purpose of the research. Elgin points out that Snell’s law applied
to anisotropic media is of limited use “if we are interested only in the path of a particular
light ray,” but is useful “if we are interested in optical refraction in general” (p.118). This
divergence in whether or not Snell’s law is true enough cannot be accounted for solely by
referencing the role the assumption of isotropic media plays in the law. It also requires
reference to the researchers’ different aims, that is, what they intend to get out of an
application of the law. This is a minor expansion of the recognized influences on a claim’s
epistemic acceptability, but it hints at a more significant shortcoming of Elgin’s conception
of understanding that will be addressed below.
When the achievement of understanding is distanced from truth, it must also be distanced
7
from belief; otherwise one would be in the position of endorsing the epistemic value of false
beliefs. Indeed, idealizations are generally regarded to be false. No biologist actually believes
she is dealing with an infinite population of organisms. Accordingly, as Elgin (2004) puts
it, “understanding is often couched in and conveyed by symbols that are not, and do not
purport to be, true” (p.116). Likewise Winsberg (2010) argues that the proper attitude to
have toward “successful model-building principles” (what I would call idealizations) is not
holding them to be true or even approximately true (p.134).3 Elliott (2013) and Elliott
and Willmes (2013) argue that scientists adopt a number of different cognitive attitudes
other than belief toward the products of science. They follow Cohen (1992) in distinguishing
between accepting and believing a body of content, such as a hypothesis, theory, model, or
other representation. On this view, contributors to understanding, including idealizations,
must be accepted—and must be epistemically acceptable—but need not be believed.4
I have characterized understanding as both an epistemic achievement and a cognitive
state, with significant features deriving from each of these attributes. I also have adopted
Elgin’s view that understanding requires only some variable threshold of approximate truth
be met, and I have suggested that this threshold depends in part on scientists’ immediate
interests. This characterization distinguishes understanding from truth, thereby setting it up
as a proper alternative for the epistemic aim of science. It also demonstrates how idealizations
can directly contribute to understanding. Idealizations facilitate understanding when they
enable the representation of cognitively valuable connections and patterns that more accurate
portrayals would miss.
There are two limitations of the conception of idealization’s value developed so far that
3Winsberg argues that these model-building principles with which he is concerned go beyond idealization
and are best described as fictions.
4There is a question regarding the relationship between this broader concept of epistemic acceptability
and knowledge. In particular, one may well wonder whether the epistemic acceptance required for scientific
understanding is sufficient to produce scientific knowledge. I sidestep this difficult question here. Let me say,
though, that I do not expect this account of science’s epistemic aim to constitute a commitment to scientific
antirealism.
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must be addressed. First, so far I have exclusively focused on science’s purely epistemic role,
that is, the production of understanding. But science plays a wide range of roles. Some
are epistemic, such as understanding; others non-epistemic, such as action within a short
timespan; and still others seem to involve both epistemic and non-epistemic elements, such
as accurate prediction (cf. Elliott, 2013). Instead of a single successor aim for truth, we
should expect a variety of scientific aims, which suit science to the range of roles it plays.
Indeed, the list of science’s aims must be open-ended, for science is a continually creative
process. Its procedures as well as its products are always in development. Surely idealized
representation contributes to these diverse aims of science in a variety of ways, not just in
virtue of its contribution to the narrowly epistemic goal of creating understanding. I say
more about how idealized representation relates to science’s other aims in the next section.
The second regard in which the view I have sketched is lacking is that, following Elgin
(2004), it preserves a role for truth that is both too central and too uniform. As a result, this
view does not fully accommodate the ways in which idealizations facilitate understanding.
Consider what Elgin says about the epistemic value of the ideal gas law:
The model is illuminating though, because we understand the properties of real
gases in terms of their deviation from the ideal. In such cases, understanding
involves a pattern of schema and correction. We represent the phenomena with
a schematic model, and introduce corrections as needed to closer accord with the
facts (p.127).
Phrasing this as schema and correction sounds awfully like the traditional view of
idealization’s contribution that I outlined above, according to which idealizations are
distortions, to be overcome or circumvented in the pursuit of truth. This is quite similar
to Elgin’s description of an idealized schema, followed by corrections in order to “closer
accord with the facts.” But the use of idealized representations like the ideal gas law and
Snell’s law (discussed above) does not conform to this picture of schema and correction.
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In many circumstances the idealized representation alone, without any corrections, is
employed. For example, the ideal gas law remains central, even though there is a more
accurate alternative—van der Waal’s equation, which takes into account molecular size and
intermolecular attraction, properties the ideal gas law simply idealizes away.
Part of the difficulty here stems from Elgin’s presupposition that all of science generates
claims that figure into arguments, explanations, or theories. This is wrong. Modeling in
science may proceed largely independent of theory, and there is a diverse array of scientific
products, many of which have little or no relationship to theory or explanation. But a
broadened conception of scientific products requires that Elgin’s definition of “true enough”
be significantly revamped. Her proposed standard of negligible divergence from truth,
taking into account a claim’s role in an argument, explanation, or theory, is still too truth-
conservative. This can be seen from Elgin’s treatment of the ideal gas law, as quoted
above. For many scientific projects, an uncorrected, schematic—that is, heavily idealized—
representation suffices. Such projects would be hindered, not furthered, by closer accordance
with the facts. Elgin also says, “if, for example, evidence shows that friction plays a major
role in collisions between gas molecules, then unless compensating adjustments are made
elsewhere, theories that model collisions as perfectly elastic spheres will be discredited”
(p.129). But this too is wrong. There may be perfectly good reasons, including epistemic
reasons, to continue to model gas-molecule collisions as if they were collisions among perfectly
elastic spheres, even if the theory that they are similar to perfectly elastic spheres is
discredited. This would be like biologists modeling relatively small populations as if they
were infinite, which enables the neglect of genetic drift when other causal influences are focal.
Significant causal influences are often idealized in just this way.
This suggests that what best facilitates understanding is not determined solely by
the relationship between a representation and the world. Instead, what representations
best facilitate understanding depends also on a range of considerations about scientists
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themselves. Those considerations include, prominently, scientists’ particular research
interests. The idealization of a population as infinite in size or a gas as comprising non-
interacting point particles is appropriate when the focus of research is elsewhere. These
idealizations are inappropriate, that is, unhelpful, when researchers want to investigate
the role of genetic drift or intermolecular attraction. A range of other considerations
about scientists themselves are also potentially relevant, including their cognitive faculties,
psychological characteristics, temporal and spatial location, etc. Because understanding is
a cognitive state, its achievement depends in part on the characteristics of those who seek
to understand. I have suggested that idealizations facilitate understanding in virtue of the
contributions broad patterns make to human understanding. It is also the case that a human
scientist must be in the right position for a representation to enable her to understand some
phenomenon. She must have the proper background information, the proper type of question,
and she must have the proper aims.
Noting these two limitations demonstrates the features that a reconstrual of the
aims of science must possess in order to accommodate the positive contributions of
widespread idealization. First, it must be acknowledged that science has a variety of aims.
Understanding may replace truth as the purely epistemic aim of science, but it is not the
ultimate aim of science simpliciter. Accordingly, the aim of understanding does not alone
account for all uses of idealizations, just their narrowly epistemic value. Second, even within
the epistemic aim of understanding, the research purpose to which an idealized representation
is put must be taken into account in the determination of whether an idealization promotes
understanding. Features of scientists themselves, including their interests and intentions,
influence what generates understanding. There is no lower limit on when an idealization
qualifies as “true enough.” Idealizations, no matter how little they resemble the systems they
represent, may facilitate an understanding of those systems in the proper circumstances.
This last point deserves a bit more discussion. It is significant that an idealization may be
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radically untrue, that is, quite different from the true state of affairs, but nonetheless facilitate
understanding. A radically untrue idealization may actually facilitate understanding in
virtue of its distance from the truth. As Strevens (2008) discusses, this style of idealization
can advertise the causal irrelevance of the idealized factor. Elgin (2004) seems to have
something like this in mind as well when she discusses idealizations’ use in “a fortiori
arguments from limiting cases” (p.119). The assumption of an infinite population size can
be a way to show that the actual size of the population is causally irrelevant, that is, that
the population is large enough—close enough to infinite—for its actual size to be completely
ignored. But this does not exhaust the contribution to understanding of radically untrue
idealizations. I suggested above that an infinite population is sometimes assumed when the
population size is small, and the role of genetic drift is significant. This occurs when research
interests focus on the causal role of other factors, like natural selection, to the exclusion of
a focus on genetic drift. Put generally, the point is that idealizations that are far from the
actual state of affairs are warranted, even when they stand in for significant causes, when the
idealized features are not central to what scientists seek to understand. These idealizations
do not facilitate understanding in virtue of their relationship to the world, that is, to the
causal facts, but in virtue of their relationship to the research interests of those seeking to
understand.
In summary, I have suggested that idealizations directly contribute to the production
of scientific understanding. If understanding is taken to be the epistemic aim of science,
this would vindicate the continuing prominence of idealized models in science. Positing
understanding as the epistemic aim of science is, then, a version of the approach I adopted
at the outset, according to which widespread idealization is used to motivate a conception
of the aims of science to which idealizations can directly contribute. Because idealizations
are patently untrue, I follow Elgin (2004) in distancing the achievement of understanding
from the achievement of truth. As Elgin says, representations, including their idealized
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assumptions, must simply be “true enough,” where this can be quite far from actual truth.
I have argued that features of human scientists, including their specific research interests in
particular instances, also influence what counts as true enough. On this view idealizations
are not preparatory to truer theories; instead they are valuable for their direct contribution
to understanding. As a result, many of the immediate products of science are not things we
believe to be true.
I conclude this section by addressing a few possible concerns with this view. First, notice
that truth does not disappear entirely from this picture. An idealization may fail to qualify
as true enough—that is, it may not be accurate enough of the world to serve its intended
purpose. In this case, the idealization will fail to facilitate understanding. If the causal
role of genetic drift is under investigation, the assumption that a medium-sized population
is infinite is inaccurate in a way that undermines the aim of research. Accordingly, this
assumption is simply not made in that research context. This is one regard (among many, I
expect) in which mystic revelation and astrology fall short. Consider astrology. No matter
what specific research project is pursued, information about celestial bodies simply does not
yield insight into human traits and actions. Astrology asserts that there are such causal
relationships, and those assertions have been empirically demonstrated to be false. Falsity
is inconsistent with any intended purpose of an assertion (of fact). In contrast, as we saw
above, idealizations such as an infinite population are not believed nor asserted, but assumed
contrary to fact. They are, then, epistemically acceptable even though untrue.
There is another regard in which truth remains relevant. I have suggested that
understanding is a candidate for the purely epistemic aim of science, but that science has
a range of other aims, some non-epistemic and some partly epistemic. Some of those aims
might best be served by true claims. This is particularly plausible for the aim of accurate
prediction. It seems that accurate predictions are best provided by true assertions about
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states of affairs.5 In this case, though, the true claim is in service of a distinct scientific aim.
Perhaps the aim of prediction is an epistemic aim in its own right? I take it that prediction
is traditionally thought to have derived epistemic value (if any), and so it seems strange to
consider prediction to be an epistemic aim on its own. But nothing is at stake for me in
that judgment. If one holds prediction to constitute an epistemic aim, then the position
developed here is that understanding is an epistemic aim of science, alongside prediction
(but not truth more generally).
But is truth-in-general not also the epistemic aim of science, at least sometimes? Let
us distinguish between three possibilities. First, perhaps sometimes straightforwardly true
claims also are best at generating understanding. In these cases, it is impossible to distinguish
the aim of truth from the aim of understanding, for the same scientific products accomplish
both. Examples might include straightforward existence claims, like that Saturn has a moon
larger than the planet Mercury, or that life on Earth has evolved from one or a few common
ancestors. Notice, though, that it is still possible to describe the prevailing epistemic aim
as understanding. If this interpretation is adopted, then these cases are naturally described
as instances in which departures from truth do not further understanding. Second, I have
said that general patterns are valuable for human understanding, but perhaps sometimes
scientists value more accurate representations over representations of general patterns. This
must be right: sometimes the exceptions or the individual instances are central to research
interests. But this too accords with the view of understanding as science’s epistemic
aim I have put forward. Whether a representation, or individual assumption, facilitates
understanding depends in part on the nature of the understanding sought. This builds in
variability to accommodate the wide range of focuses for scientific understanding. Third
and lastly, consider the possibility that sometimes true scientific products are developed
at the expense of understanding, that is, that produces less understanding of a focal
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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phenomenon in order to be more veridical. I can imagine this when there is some other
aim at play, such as prediction, but not otherwise. Of course, this might simply be due to
my impoverished imagination; I would happily entertain possible counterexamples. But I
would wager that, when the world’s complexity and variability inhibits representations that
are both accurate and comprehendible, comprehension (or predictability, or etc.) always
trumps simple accuracy.
One final concern is that this approach seems to provide a terribly subjective standard
for science’s epistemic success. There is one subjective element: what best facilitates
understanding depends in part on the features of the practitioners and consumers of science.
But this element of subjectivity is unproblematic. Indeed, it is to be expected for an account
of a scientific enterprise developed by limited and historically located human beings. What
best meets human requirements—including our epistemic requirements—depends not just on
features of the world we investigate but also, in part, on the features of human investigators.
Other forms of subjectivity that would be problematic do not apply. One need not rely
on the subjective experience of an “aha!” moment, viz., the felt sense of understanding
(Trout, 2002), in order to judge whether an idealization facilitates understanding. Instead,
objective reasons guide that judgment. These reasons might include limited computational
power or absolute computational limits; the limitations of human powers of cognition or the
limitations in one researcher’s training; the existence of a causal pattern or the existence of
specific research interests. All are objective features of the world under investigation or of
the scientists leading that investigation that together determine what best generates human
understanding.
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2 The Aims of Science in Tension
If the position developed above is right, the epistemic aim of science is not truth, but
understanding. Yet, as I have already acknowledged, there are a variety of aims of science,
both epistemic and non-epistemic. Traditionally appreciated aims include (at least) accurate
prediction, explanation, and representation. Other aims of science have recently received
increasing attention. These include providing information to guide policymaking (Douglas,
2009b); action within a short timespan (Elliott, 2013); and facilitating the public uptake of
scientific knowledge (Elliott, 2011). There are surely many other aims and, indeed, many
other existing articulations of these and other aims. My project here is not to delineate
the range of scientific aims; above I suggested that we should expect an open-ended list of
aims. My goal is instead to examine the relationship among the various aims of science. In
particular, I suggest that it is the norm for the pursuit of one aim to occur at the expense
of others. Successful pursuit of one among the various aims of science generally inhibits
success with other aims. Accurate prediction is achieved by tools poorly suited to explain;
the aim of quick action is at odds with full causal representation; etc. At root, this is because
the different aims of science are furthered by different means. This too traces back to the
centrality of idealizations in science.
Notice first that the diversity of scientific aims is linked also to a diversity of cognitive
attitudes toward the products of science. Recall from above that embracing understanding,
instead of truth, as the epistemic aim of science requires shifting from a focus solely on
belief to the broader concept of acceptance. This is because many aids to understanding
are not things we believe to be true. I followed Elgin in phrasing the alternative, broader
concept “epistemic acceptance.” But acceptance, like the aims of science themselves, comes
in many varieties. Elliott and Willmes (2013) define acceptance as follows: “S accepts that
h, iff S presupposes h for specific reasons in her deliberation” (p.5). This definition can
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yield the subspecies of epistemic acceptance by restricting the relevant specific reasons to
the furtherance of understanding. In this way, one can generate other varieties of acceptance
by focusing on other, specific aims of science. For instance, acceptance as predictively useful
amounts to presupposing for purposes of predictive value (alone). It is clear that one form of
acceptance need not entail another. Epistemic acceptance does not entail acceptance as true
(i.e. belief), nor does it entail acceptance as predictable useful. The value of an assumption
in the production of understanding does not entail that it is true, nor does it entail its
predictive usefulness.
Just as one form of acceptance need not entail another, the pursuit of one aim of
science need not contribute to other aims. Believing a true claim might be useful for a
variety of other aims, such as prediction or guidance of action. In contrast, accepting a
claim for its contribution to a specific purpose may not yield similar success with other
purposes. Indeed, something stronger is true: success with one aim often inhibits success
with other aims. Science as a whole employes a variety of tools to achieve, e.g., predictions,
explanations, causal representations, and the basis for action. What suits a tool to further
one of these aims does not well suit it for the other aims. For example, one method used to
generate predictions is the analysis of a variety of models with competing assumptions, called
robustness analysis. This is a common method in climate modeling (Parker, 2011). But none
of those models are expected to accurately represent the causal influences on climate, nor
to explain climate change. Indeed, accurate representation of specific causal influences is
impossible, for the models represent influences in multiple, incompatible ways. Here the
tool of robustness analysis helps achieve one aim, but there are many other aims to which
it cannot contribute. A second example of conflicting aims in climate modeling is that the
aim of accurate prediction calls for assumptions that are expected to deliver the most likely
outcomes, whereas the aim of policy guidance might instead motivate placing particular
value on the riskiest possible outcomes.
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This division in the pursuit of different aims of science is due in part to the widespread
use of idealizations and the variety of purposes idealizations serve. Recall from above that
whether an idealization furthers understanding depends on the specific goals of the research.
This is why, e.g., Snell’s law is appropriate to apply to anisotropic media when researchers
want to understand optical refraction in general, but not when they want to understand the
path of a specific light ray. To generalize, whether an idealization furthers any particular
aim of science depends on the specifics of that aim. Snell’s law may help us understand
optical refraction, but it is too idealized to give precise predictions of light’s path of travel in
anisotropic media. For that we need a different tool. Consider also the example just above
of making climate predictions with the use of several idealized models, models that do not
help us understand climate change.
The idea that different aims of science generally must be pursued separately is evocative of
Cartwright’s (1983) study of how laws are either false and explanatory or else predictive (but
not both). Elsewhere I have defended the view that the aims of explanation and confirmation
push in different directions (Potochnik, 2010). Isaac (2013) argues that models have specific
functions, such as prediction and use in policymaking, and that many of these functions
are best satisfied by abandoning the goal of realistic representation. The separate pursuit
of scientific aims is also related to the view that there are tradeoffs among the desirable
features of models, such as their generality, precision, and realism or accuracy (Levins, 1966;
Odenbaugh, 2003; Matthewson and Weisberg, 2009). This is the idea that increasing a
model’s generality, for example, must be achieved by decreasing its precision or accuracy.
Different features of models, such as greater generality or greater precision, will differently
position those models to contribute to particular representational or predictive aims. In my
view, the nature of the selected tradeoff reflects the specific purpose to which a model or
other scientific product is put.
This conception of the aims of science in conflict requires one amendment. Not only
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do the aims of science often conflict, but so too can deployments of a single aim, including
even the narrowly epistemic aim of understanding. Recall from above that idealizations
can facilitate understanding of a phenomenon by demonstrating that some of its features—
including causally important features—are nonetheless unimportant to the current research
focus. Which features are to be understood is, thus, relative to a specific research focus. This
means that an understanding of some features of a phenomenon can be purchased at the cost
of misunderstanding, i.e. misrepresenting, other features. So, for example, an evolutionary
game theory model may demonstrate the role of natural selection in producing cooperative
behavior, while occluding the role of non-selective and non-evolutionary influences. These
might include specific genetic influences and alternative, non-evolutionary influences like
learning, to name just two possibilities. In the context of other research programs, such as
those with a population genetic focus or an epigenetic focus, understanding other influences
on cooperative behavior will move to center stage. This shows how the epistemic aim of
understanding can, in itself, motivate different scientific products that are appropriate for
different research focuses. The same is true for other scientific aims. Different models or sets
of models of a single phenomenon often are suited to different predictive tasks. Different
explanations of the same phenomenon are called for in different research contexts (Lewis,
1986; Potochnik, 2015).
There are two primary reasons for the tension among different aims of science and different
deployments of a single aim—reasons, also, for the variety of idealizations’ contributions to
the aims of science. These are the complexity of phenomena of scientific interest coupled
with the limited powers of human cognition and action. The complexity of phenomena
investigated in science is by now well appreciated; see, for instance, (Dupré, 1993; Cartwright,
1999; Mitchell, 2003; Strevens, 2006; Wimsatt, 2007). All of the scientific aims discussed
in this paper are valuable for their ability to further human comprehension and control
of this complex world. Their furtherance is, thus, relative to the limitations of human
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cognition and action. This leads to the tension among the successful pursuit of different
aims, and even among versions of the same aim. Guiding policy and action are obvious
examples of scientific aims influenced by human limitations, and these aims can motivate
sacrificing, for example, some predictive accuracy or depth of causal analysis in order to
inform policy in a timely manner or focus especially on the riskiest scenarios. The aim of
prediction is similarly shaped by human limitations. We have already seen how robustness
analysis can generate predictions, without accurately representing causal influences or, for
that matter, providing understanding of the system in question. Additionally, when faced
with the complex phenomena that are the norm in scientific investigation, scientists must
even choose which features of phenomena to focus on successfully predicting. So, human
limitations in the face of complexity even lead to tension among different specific predictive
aims.
The pursuit of scientific explanations is also influenced by human limitations. Expla-
nation is in furtherance of human cognition, and its features are crucially shaped by this
goal (Potochnik, 2011). This is why, as I suggested above, the aims of explanation and
confirmation motivate opposed scientific practices, and why different explanations of the
same phenomenon are called for in different research contexts. Finally, if I am right that
the epistemic aim of science is understanding, then this too is in service to, and shaped
by, the particularities of human powers of comprehension. The limited powers of human
beings and especially of our cognition, when faced with incredibly complex phenomena, are
accommodated with the help of idealizations, but idealizations that are specific to their
purposes. Idealizations that further understanding of one feature of a phenomenon tend to
obscure other features, and they cannot be expected to serve other aims, such as accurate
prediction, equally well. This scenario results in focus on one particular scientific aim (at a
time) to the exclusion of others and results in a divide-and-conquer approach, where scientific
products are tailored to their precise aims. In order to successfully predict, or to represent
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a certain element of the causal structure, or to provide quick guidance for policy, one often
must sacrifice other aims.
It is instructive to consider the nature of the position most directly opposed to my view
of the conflicting aims of science. The opposed position is that the same scientific products
individually further all aims of science—at least accurate representation, explanation, and
prediction, and possibly also including more human-centric aims like providing grounds for
policymaking. If this were the case, a single, best model or theory would simultaneously offer
the best causal representation, the best explanation, and the best predictions. I suspect this
kind of view is motivated by an implicit commitment to the idea that scientific products are
true depictions of the world. If that were generally the case, then one could expect individual
scientific products to play all these roles. Representations that were true in all important
regards would provide a sufficient causal representation, be explanatorily unimpeachable,
and ground accurate predictions. But science does not aim for such truth, or so I have
argued here. The aims of science are accordingly in tension.
This view of opposition among scientific aims also conflicts, though less directly, with
views that relate confirmation and prediction to explanation. One example of such a view
is inference to the best explanation, where explanatory considerations are used to guide
beliefs. Another is Douglas’s (2009a) argument that focusing on the aim of prediction sheds
light on approaches to explanation. A similar kind of view is suggested by appeals to the
simultaneous pursuit of multiple scientific aims—often prediction and explanation—that
some philosophical works make in passing. Consider, as just one example, Odenbaugh and
Alexandrova (2011) who, in the process of criticizing robustness analysis, emphasize the need
to test “empirical hypotheses that later figure in explanations of particular. . . phenomena”
(p.758). They see the confirmation of hypotheses—presumably by the accuracy of the
predictions those hypotheses ground—to be preparatory for explanatory work. In contrast
to this kind of view, I have suggested that these aims of science are in tension. If this is right,
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then one should not expect successful prediction to facilitate explanation, nor vice versa.
The conception of the relationship among scientific aims developed here helps make sense
of a feature of science that might otherwise be puzzling. Across science there is a proliferation
of different approaches to studying the same phenomenon, approaches that apparently are in
conflict with one another. For instance, Longino (2013) surveys a wide variety of approaches
to the study of human behavior, and in particular, human sexuality and aggressivity. Similar
to my criticism in this section of the idea that individual scientific products further all
scientific aims, Longino criticizes the supposition “that ‘pure’ (a.k.a. ‘basic’) research can
provide comprehensive knowledge of a phenomenon that can then be applied to or drawn on
for the solution to practical problems” (p.149). Instead she takes a pluralist stance, according
to which different approaches provide knowledge, knowledge that is incommensurable across
approaches. According to Longino, multiple, incommensurate items of knowledge are
possible because each approach differently defines the exact phenomenon under investigation
and differently parses the space of causal influences. Thus, on her view “there are many
truths,” each useful to a different purpose (p.149). Despite this, Longino allows that “we
may remain metaphysically committed to the view that multiple factors or processes are
interacting in our one world” (p.146, 147).
The tension among the various scientific aims (and specific deployments of individual
aims) grounds one possible interpretation of this proliferation of approaches and the apparent
conflict among approaches. Consider the case of investigations of human aggressivity. If
accurate representation of the full suite of causes of aggressivity were the uniform aim of
those investigations, and if one is metaphysically committed to one world with a single
causal structure, then we should expect different research results to be reconcilable. That
is, there would be something to say about the respects in which each does better or worse
at representing the causes of human aggressivity. In contrast to this expectation, Longino
makes the case that “each approach offers a partial understanding framed by distinctive
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questions and distinctive parsings of the causal space” (p.135). This suggests that there
is no unitary aim for all these different research approaches. On my interpretation, the
various aims guiding this research may include a number of distinct representational goals,
predictive goals, use in policymaking, etc. A variety of such different aims would generate
incommensurable findings of the sort Longino identifies, findings that nonetheless are about
the same phenomenon and may equally qualify as successful science.
Conflict among different aims of science also accounts for the persistence of deep
disagreements about fundamental principles within otherwise functional fields of research.
Such disagreements are found, for instance, in a variety of debates within the field of
population biology (?). Distinct scientific products, utilizing different idealizations, are
helpful in the pursuit of different particular representational aims, and other aims entirely.
This not only results in incompatible approaches, as discussed just above; it also can result in
scientists adhering to different, incompatible approaches. On the face of it, this can appear
to constitute a deep theoretical divide, and may even be construed as such by some scientists.
But subscribing to the view set out in this section enables an alternative interpretation. Each
approach may be successful given its specific aim, and no approach succeeds in addressing
all the relevant aims.
In summary, in this section I have developed the view that the different aims of science
and even specific deployments of individual aims are often best pursued separately. Different
scientific products are generally best suited to different aims of representation, prediction,
explanation, guidance of policy or action, etc. This is due in part to the variety of purposes
served by idealizations, and so the variety of idealizations incorporated into models and other
representations. I have suggested that this outcome is ultimately due to the limited powers
of human cognition and action, when faced with the exceedingly complex phenomena under
scientific investigation.
In light of this variety of scientific aims and multiple deployments of individual aims,
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one might wonder how to discern which aim is served by each individual scientific project.
If there are many different, potentially applicable scientific aims, by what standard should
we judge the success of individual scientific products? Some generalizations can be made
about what determines the applicable aims. First, as outlined above, the particular research
focus directly influences which features of a phenomenon are to be understood. The
research program also influences the broader determination of the importance of prediction,
explanation, guidance of action, etc. Some research agendas in behavioral ecology focus on
the role of natural selection in producing a behavior, whereas research on epigenetics will
foreground environmental influence on genetic factors. For both of these focuses, prediction
tends to be much less central than it is in climate science. A second type of influence on
what aim is applicable is the features of the practitioners of science and their target audience.
Much climate research aims to furnish us with predictions in part because climate change is
expected to have vast humanitarian, economic, political, and other consequences for humans.
In turn, whether a prediction is intended for other researchers or for policy-makers may lead
to an emphasis on, respectively, accuracy or risk-minimization.
When it comes to determining the aim by which a particular scientific product should
be judged, the applicable aim can often be ascertained by charitable interpretation of the
research conducted, including its setup, the conclusions drawn, and its research and social
contexts. There may nonetheless be ambiguity regarding what aim is pursued and, thus, by
what standard the work should be judged. Even more common is a mismatch between the
pursued aim and conclusions drawn from the research by other researchers or, especially, by
the popular media. A first step toward eliminating such confusions is to explicitly recognize
that any given scientific product is in service of some particular aim, and may well not
contribute to any other aims of science.
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3 The Expanded Influence of Social Values
In §1 I motivated an alternative construal of science’s epistemic aim, based on the observation
of continuing widespread idealization in science. In particular, I argued that if the epistemic
aim of science is not truth but understanding, this would enable idealizations to directly
contribute to science’s epistemic success. I claimed there that the aim of understanding
is not problematically subjective, because what furthers human understanding depends
on objective features of the world under investigation and of the scientists leading that
investigation. Then, in §2 I suggested that there are many diverse aims of science—some
epistemic, others non-epistemic, and still others somewhere in between—and that these
diverse aims motivate different types of scientific products. We should expect an open-ended
list of scientific aims. Yet there is an overarching theme that unifies those aims. All the
aims of science further cognition or action; indeed, they further human cognition or action,
as a science by and for human beings should. Moreover, I have suggested that in order to
determine the aims by which a scientific product’s success is to be judged, one must consider
features of the particular researchers and their target audience. The account of the aims
of science developed in this paper thus explicitly links those aims to particularities about
human scientists and human consumers of science.
In this final section I consider two implications this human-centric conception of science’s
aims has for the role of social values in science. First, there are several avenues by which
rather obvious and mundane effects of social values turn out to have epistemic significance,
in virtue of shaping the requirements for scientific understanding. The epistemic influence of
social values is kept in check, though, with the threshold requirement of “true enough”—a
loose and variable tether to reality. Second, the diversity of science’s aims, and the diverse
scientific products this results in, also extends the influence of social values on science’s other
aims. Which aim, and which variety of an aim, is pursued depends also upon social values.
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Social values are of obvious relevance to at least some of the purely non-epistemic aims of
science. For instance, Douglas (2009b) argues that social values are relevant to determining
the evidential standards behind the use of science in policymaking. But, as Elliott and
Willmes (2013) point out, there seems to be a relevant difference between this and the
influence of social values on science’s epistemic aims. As those authors indicate, ethical
values do not seem to be relevant to determining whether a hypothesis is true. Construing
science’s epistemic aim as truth thus seems to tightly constrain social values’ epistemic
influence. Our values may influence what truths we seek, and how we employ those truths,
but not what is and is not true.
In contrast, the alternative construal of science’s epistemic aim as understanding creates
additional inroads for the epistemic influence of values. One obvious role for the influence
of social and political concerns is in the choice of which research questions are pursued
and how those research programs are subsequently developed. The possible directions for
research are vast, and human concerns and values shape which of these possible directions
are in fact pursued. Considerations introduced in this paper elevate this obvious role for
social values to epistemic significance. I have argued that the precise research agenda helps
guide the requirements for understanding. If this is right, then the values that shape the
research agenda have direct epistemic implications. Many different aims of representation
and understanding (among other aims entirely) can be brought to the investigation of any
given phenomenon. This is illustrated by Longino’s (2013) study of the wide variety of
scientific research into human sexuality and aggression, as discussed in the prior section.
Different research agendas lead to different emphases and parsings of the causal space
and, as a result, vastly different varieties of understanding. Additionally, as I showed
above, particularities of a research program partially determine whether a claim or other
representational element contributes positively to understanding and, accordingly, whether
it is true enough.
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I have also claimed that, besides the research program, features of researchers themselves
and of the target audience influences what variety of understanding is sought and, thus,
what representational elements are true enough. These are, then, other avenues for the
epistemic influence of social values. Our values are reflected not only in the nature of the
research programs pursued in science, but also in who pursues that research, and in whom
it is pursued for. These seemingly humble influences of social values on science often have
been ignored because of their apparent irrelevance to epistemic concerns. But there is now a
well-developed literature, especially in feminist philosophy of science, about how features of
the practitioners of science influence the content of scientific knowledge. The view developed
here suggests one way in which that influence is exerted. Features of researchers and their
audience have epistemic influence in virtue of how they shape the specific requirements for
scientific understanding.
A scientist’s features can, of course, influence the nature of the research program she
pursues. But even beyond that, what a scientist brings to her work can influence which
causal influences are salient, what patterns are seen in the phenomena, and thus, the variety
of understanding produced. Consider, as an example of the epistemic influence of researchers’
characteristics, Hrdy’s (1986) analysis of how a shift in the gender ratio of primatologists
led to significantly different types of observations about the behavior of male and female
primates. Particular features of the intended audience—such as their background knowledge,
and their position to act—can also shape which aspects of phenomena scientists should aim
to provide them with an understanding of. Recall that whether any given posit facilitates
understanding is what determines whether it is true enough. As a result, while social and
ethical concerns may not directly influence whether a claim is true, they do influence whether
a claim is true enough via their influence on research program, researchers, and the audience
for the research.
I also claimed in §1 that taking understanding to be the ultimate epistemic aim of science
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is not problematically subjective. The avenues I have suggested for social values’ epistemic
influences correspond to the ways in which epistemic success is properly subjective, viz.,
that what best facilitates understanding depends in part on the features of the practitioners
and consumers of science. Just as our values cannot determine whether a hypothesis is
true, similar limitations obtain for understanding, taken as a form of epistemic success.
There are regards in which social concerns cannot legitimately influence the content of
our understanding. Once the focal phenomenon and research agenda are set, we cannot
choose whether an idealized assumption facilitates understanding, nor can we choose whether
a representation can convey understanding. These are shaped entirely by features of
the phenomenon under investigation, the scientific tools available, and human psychology.
Accordingly, the requirement of “true enough” cannot be influenced by our social concerns.
The significantly weakened version of this requirement I have motivated provides only a loose
and variable tether to reality, but it is a tether nonetheless.
The idea that science’s diverse aims motivate different types of scientific products also
expands the space for the influence of social values. In §2 I opposed that idea to the
view, often left implicit, that true (or approximately true) representations are used to
accurately predict, explain phenomena, guide policy decisions, etc. If this were so, then
the influence of social values on these latter scientific activities would be constrained by
their inability to influence what is and is not true. On that view, what we aim to predict
or our evidential standards for policymaking, e.g., may be influenced by our values, but
what representations satisfy these aims cannot be. Embracing instead the idea that success
with one aim inhibits successful pursuit of other aims eliminates this constraint. The most
predictively accurate representations are not very explanatory, our best explanations tend
to be somewhat inaccurate representations, etc. Values can find their way into which aim is
pursued and what specific deployment of an aim is intended. This in turn influences what
characteristics the resulting scientific product should have. This idea is very similar to the
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conclusion reached by Elliott and McKaughan (2014) that nonepistemic considerations can
override epistemic considerations in virtue of the different goals scientists can have, when
coupled with tradeoffs among the desirable features scientific representations might possess.
It is also reminiscent of Longino’s suggestion that even the epistemic value of empirical
adequacy, which might seem basic to all empirical pursuits, is negotiable, for some accuracy
can be sacrificed for other desirable epistemic features, such as simplicity or generality (2001,
p.185,186).
Consider two brief examples of how values might influence the specific research aim.
First, the political commitments of researchers or funding agencies might influence whether
predictive research on climate change places greater emphasis on the riskiest scenarios, the
least risky scenarios, or weights scenarios simply by their likelihood. None of these strategies
is epistemically more sound than the others, yet they are predictive aims distinct from one
another that will likely result in different results. As a second, less conjectural example,
consider Joan Roughgarden’s research in behavioral ecology. According to Roughgarden
(2009), her values lead her to emphasize the role of “kindness and cooperation” in animals’
traits and their evolutionary history. The view I have motivated here would construe
this emphasis as a commitment to a particular type of representational project, namely,
representing the causal role(s) of cooperative behavior and mutually beneficial outcomes in
the evolution of animal behavior. Here too there are limits on values’ proper role. Social
values cannot influence the accuracy of our predictions. The desires of researchers and their
funders cannot determine the likelihood of the riskiest scenarios, only what emphasis those
likelihoods receive in scientific research. One cannot represent a pattern that does not obtain.
Roughgarden may pursue a representational project that has been largely neglected, but the
pursuit of that project is necessary but not sufficient for its success. Any scientific project
may, in the end, suffer a fate similar to astrology’s.
I have not here attempted a full analysis of influences on the aims of scientific research
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and the specific deployments of those aims. There may be many other inroads for the
epistemic influence of social values beyond those I have identified here. My purpose in
this section has been to show how the views developed above elevate simple ways in which
particular humans and their values influence science to great significance, including epistemic
significance. Two individuals cannot know contradictory things about the same phenomenon,
defined in the same way. This is so even if those individuals have different backgrounds,
values, interests, etc. But all of those differences among the individual practitioners and
consumers of science are relevant to what phenomena are under investigation; how those
phenomena are construed; which causal influences and patterns are of primary interest;
what connections are drawn to other phenomena; and other elements of scientific research.
All of these differences affect the variety of understanding that is sought or, more generally,
the specific scientific aim pursued. This provides a means for our individual characteristics
and values to legitimately influence the nature of our scientific understanding in a way that
they could not influence scientific truth.
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